Attacking the Quantum Internet by Satoh, Takahiko et al.
1Attacking the Quantum Internet
Takahiko Satoh, Shota Nagayama, Shigeya Suzuki, Member, IEEE, Takaaki Matsuo,
and Rodney Van Meter, Member, IEEE
Abstract—The main service provided by the coming Quantum
Internet will be creating entanglement between any two quantum
nodes. We discuss and classify attacks on quantum repeaters,
which will serve roles similar to those of classical Internet
routers. We have modeled the components for and structure of
quantum repeater network nodes. With this model, we point out
attack vectors, then analyze attacks in terms of confidentiality,
integrity and availability. While we are reassured about the
promises of quantum networks from the confidentiality point
of view, integrity and availability present new vulnerabilities
not present in classical networks and require care to handle
properly. We observe that the requirements on the classical com-
puting/networking elements affect the systems’ overall security
risks. This component-based analysis establishes a framework for
further investigation of network-wide vulnerabilities.
Index Terms—Quantun Internet, Quantum network security.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE computers and networks in common use today arebuilt on classical notions of information, generally using
small amounts of electrical charge, the orientation of tiny
magnets, and optical signals as data. We typically treat the
data states as binary numbers or symbols and manipulate
them using familiar, comfortable Boolean logic. But over the
last three decades, a new theory of information based on
quantum mechanics has been discovered, quantum algorithms
have been developed, experimental demonstrations of quantum
computing have proliferated, and large-scale machines are on
the drawing boards [3], [61], [75], [82]. One of the oldest
and most successful areas in quantum information has been
quantum networks [20], [45], [74], [79], [84].
Work on quantum networks began with the recognition
that quantum states serve as exquisite sensors of the real
world, and can be used to detect the presence of eavesdrop-
pers on a quantum communication channel while creating
shared, secret random numbers useful as keys for encrypting
classical data, known as quantum key distribution (QKD [8],
[26]). The array of proposed applications for distributed quan-
tum information has grown to include other cybernetic uses
such as clock synchronization, reference frame alignment,
and interferometry for astronomy [4], [32], [43]. Distributed
quantum computation will help to build large scale quantum
computers, especially by combining heterogeneous quantum
modules. [16], [33], [60], [70], [76]. The development of
large-scale quantum computers would affect classical security
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systems that depend on the difficulty of certain computational
problems, but conversely distributed security-related functions
such as Byzantine agreement and secret sharing recoup some
of those losses [7], [19]. Broadbent et al. developed a fully
blind method of conducting any arbitrary quantum calcula-
tion (BQC [14], [15]). Unlike Gentry’s classical homomorphic
encryption [30], this technique hides the algorithm itself as
well as the input and output data. Thus, if we can find ways
of distributing quantum information over long distances, we
will enable valuable new functionality.
Quantum entanglement is a correlation between the states
of two or more quantum variables, stronger than any possible
classical correlation [34], [81]. Although entanglement cannot
be used to transmit information faster than the speed of
light, two quantum variables may be in an entangled state
where their values are decided randomly but seemingly in
an instantaneously coordinated fashion without any apparent
communication. This phenomenon worried Einstein enough
that he dubbed it “spooky action at a distance.” Many of the ap-
plications just discussed require us to create this entanglement
over a distance. Quantum repeaters (Sec. II) are an important
path toward building a Quantum Internet that will achieve this
goal.
The early use of the quantum Internet with high noise
levels would be to enhance Internet security with QKD [21],
[27], [28]. Various attack methods for preventing such security
improvement have already been proposed [31], [40], [50],
[51], [65]. Defense methods, operational methods with optimal
efficiency, and specific methods for combining with classical
protocols have also been proposed [1], [12], [53] Urban-scale
networks have already been built by trusting intermediate
nodes to avoid the requirement of quantum repeaters, and their
performance has been demonstrated [64], [68], [71], [78].
The classical Internet, the global-scale network, has
emerged over some five decades, and security is a major area
in research, engineering and operations [6]. Both hardware
and software evolve quickly, and both attacks and defense
applied to network infrastructure and end nodes emerge at
an astounding rate. Some attacks compromise individual com-
puters or data, either during the initiation or data transfer
phases of a communication session, by spoofing data pack-
ets, hijacking connections, or cracking encryption. Attacks
on sessions can also be attempted more speculatively by
compromising systems, then laying in wait for opportunities
to present themselves. Other vulnerabilities affect the stability
of the network itself by disrupting routing or naming systems,
or by flooding portions of the network with excess traffic.
Such vulnerabilities and attacks have to be discussed to design
secure quantum Internet architectures.
In this paper, we summarize and develop primitive models
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2of attacks on individual components of quantum networks. At-
tackers’ purpose may be parallel to those in classical networks:
• to steal quantum information; or
• to hijack a quantum connection; or
• to disrupt either the integrity or availability of quantum
nodes or quantum networks; or
• to hijack computing resources such as controls of quan-
tum repeaters or external components.
The biggest difference between classical/quantum networks
is the presence of entanglement. This difference raises ques-
tions:
• Can the use of entanglement results in copying or disclo-
sure of quantum data during a session?
• Can entanglement lurking in a repeater compromise later
sessions by hijacking valuable qubits or undetected dis-
closure?
Even without entanglement, new questions are raised, such as
• Can control of the quantum hardware elements allow
hijacking or disclosure? (classical hardware is vulnerable
to damage from strong electrical or optical pulses)
• Are quantum nodes more vulnerable than classical sys-
tems? (This question is dependent on implementation,
and is a moving target we will not address here.)
More generally, to have the quantum Internet scalable,
• can the function of creating end-to-end entanglement be
disrupted on a scale disproportionate to the fraction of
the network compromise?
While attacks attempting theft target operations of a commu-
nication session, this question conjures effects to fundamental
network functionalities such as routing [77]. The discussion
to answer these questions must last long in the future. This
paper gives the first framework to categorize attacks in pursuit
of these goals.
To classify attacks on quantum networks, it would be
valuable to refer to proposed taxonomies for classical systems,
especially RFID systems, by Weingart [80], Mitrokotsa [55],
and Mirowski [54]. Quantum repeater systems and RFID
systems have similar properties that make this analogy apt:
both systems are tightly coupled hybrid systems of sensing
and software elements, and also expect to make use of the
effects of interaction with the outside world, and hence are
sensitive to noise or deliberate inputs.
While we can model the basic hardware architecture of a
quantum network nodes and have some idea of required ele-
ments, a concrete design for a specific implementation of such
a system has not been achieved yet. We begin with an overview
of the Quantum Internet (Sec. II) and a hardware model that
will allow us to identify points of attack, then classify the
primitive attacks (Sec. III). We then investigate the means of
attack on the Quantum Internet through the elements of the
Quantum Nodes (Sec. IV), and also discuss what an attacker
who has hijacked control of one or more Quantum Nodes can
do (Sec. V). We believe that this paper will contribute toward
designing secure quantum Internet architectures. In such work,
knowledge gained during the engineering of classical networks
will be beneficial to minimize security issues of developing
quantum networks.
II. QUANTUM INTERNET
We have already introduced the concept of quantum entan-
glement and what it is good for, but not how widely distributed
entanglement can be created. A network of optical links
connected by quantum repeaters will fill the role of classical
network links and switches or routers. End nodes that can
connect to the quantum network will provide various quantum
services that enable the uses discussed above. As in the
classical Internet, individual quantum networks of potentially
heterogeneous technology and independent management will
ultimately come together to form a Quantum Internet [74].
A. The role of a Quantum Repeater
To perform long distance communication, a Quantum re-
peater must supply the following four functions.
1) Node-to-Node Entanglement generation: Experimental
physicists have demonstrated the creation of entanglement
over short distances using single photons (e.g. [56]). Numerous
approaches have been proposed and some of them demon-
strated, but for our purposes here a single example will suffice.
Individual quantum bits, or qubits, at each node may be single
atoms suspended in a vacuum or another of the dozens of
technologies under experimental development. A qubit at each
end of a link is coaxed to emit a photon that is entangled
with the qubit. The two photons are routed toward each other
and ultimately interfere in a fashion that erases knowledge
of where each photon came from, leaving the two stationary
qubits entangled in what is called a Bell pair, named for a
proposal made by John Bell over fifty years ago [5].
2) Stretching of Entanglement: Unfortunately, we can’t
transmit those photons over arbitrary distances. In optical
fibers, the probability of success falls exponentially with
distance as photons are lost, and classical amplifiers cannot
be used in quantum networks because independent copies
of quantum data cannot be made [83]. Moreover, in any
interesting network, naturally, we want to support multi-hop
paths between pairs of nodes, rather than requiring a direct
link between each pair. Both problems can be solved by
using entanglement swapping, which takes two Bell pairs, one
between nodes A and B and one between nodes B and C,
and splices them together to form a single Bell pair that spans
from A to C [35]. Entanglement swapping can be said, very
roughly, to perform the role held by packet forwarding in the
Internet, with the significant caveat that it operates all along
the path rather than at a node at a time.
3) Management of errors: The quality, or fidelity, of these
Bell pairs declines as we perform more of these swapping
operations, eventually destroying the quantumness of the data
and leaving only random classical noise. This problem can
be solved by using a form of error detection known as
purification [10] or using quantum error correction [23], [22].
Purification plus entanglement swapping is the canonical setup
of a chain of quantum repeaters [13].
4) Participate in managing network: Management of topol-
ogy, routing, tomography, also presence of malicious actors,
key point of this paper.
3More than two qubits can be entangled at one time, either
intentionally by the end nodes, by an eavesdropper trying to
listen in, or as the quantum information leaks out of imper-
fectly isolated devices [63]. We can detect the presence of an
eavesdropper and assess the fidelity of two-qubit entanglement
using a process known as quantum tomography [2], [18],
[37]. As we assess the fidelity of our two-party entanglement,
we simultaneously attempt to rule out that a third party is
entangled with us [17], [34], [47], [73]. This serves as the
basis of one form of quantum key distribution [26]. This
process requires the generation and consumption of many Bell
pairs to determine the statistical characteristics of a quantum
channel or path, and cannot be used to determine anything
about any individual Bell pair. Selection of Bell pairs to be
sacrificed for tomography must be random and secure; if
the eavesdropper can predict which pairs will be used, she
can remain undetected simply by choosing not to entangle
or interfere with those pairs [69]. However, confidence in
our assessment grows slowly as a full tomographic procedure
converges incrementally by consuming substantial numbers
of Bell pairs, so other approaches to state monitoring are
under development; this remains an important research topic
for robust, secure, efficient Quantum Internet operation [25],
[62].
B. Types of nodes
We can classify quantum network nodes (QNodes) under
four types by the number of connected (quantum) links and
their roles:
End node (ENode)
An ENode works as a terminal node for running quantum
applications. In order to support various applications, qubit
operations and memory functions are required. An ENode
has exactly one external link and corresponds to clients and
servers.
Measurement node (MNode)
An MNode is a terminal node just for measurement, used by
end users for QKD or blind quantum computation [57], [58].
The only necessary function is to measure qubits, therefore
an MNode has no static memory. An MNode has exactly one
external link. We can regard an MNode as a simpler ENode.
Repeater (RNode)
RNodes are installed at fixed distances according to the optical
fiber loss level to improve network performance in long-
distance quantum communications [13]. An RNode has exactly
two external links, so that it is useful in a line only. RNodes
correspond to repeaters in classical networking.
Router (XNode)
An XNode has two or more external links, e.g. connected
internally via an optical backplane [60]. XNodes have more
substantial processing capacities than other node types and are
responsible for branching the route of the network.
Fig. 1 depicts an example of a small quantum re-
peater network consisting of QNodes connected by quantum
channels. QNodes are physically connected by a quantum
communication-capable channel, such as optical fiber. Adja-
cent QNodes can create entanglement between their qubits.
We assume that QNodes can classically communicate with
any other QNodes via classical channels such as the Internet
(not shown in Fig. 1). Therefore, security issues in classical
communications share the situation with Internet security.
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Fig. 1. Schematic diagram of interconnected nodes. Bell pairs can be shared
directly between adjacent nodes. Classical communication is possible between
all nodes. Distances will depend on technology, but most likely will be 10s
of km over fiber.
Each QNode has network addresses, such as IP addresses,
for various inter-repeater classical information communica-
tion. While our minimum requirement is having an address
unique among the set of reachable quantum repeater nodes,
to simplify our discussion, we assume all quantum repeater
nodes have global Internet access, which means each quantum
repeater node must have IP addresses. Topics that may require
consideration in the context of a global-scale classical Internet,
such as distributed denial of service (DDoS)-style attacks, are
outside the scope of this paper.
C. Types of networks
Types of quantum repeater networks are characterized by
mechanisms for managing the two most important forms of
errors: photon losses and state errors caused by gate errors
and memory decoherence [59]. They are labeled in several
generations depending on signaling directions transmitted by
the used technologies:
1G repeater
Entanglement purification and acknowledged entanglement
swapping are employed in this type [13], [24], [39], [67]. High
fidelity Bell pairs are generated by entanglement purification
with bidirectional classical communication (a two-way entan-
glement purification protocol, or 2-EPP) and those Bell pairs
4are shared between non-neighboring repeaters using entangle-
ment swapping [35]. This type is useful with low success rate,
low fidelity, and a small number of qubit memories.
2G repeater
In this type, the network generates encoded Bell pairs between
each nearest neighbor repeater pair and performs entanglement
swapping to create encoded Bell pairs between arbitrary
repeater pair [29], [38], [49], [46]. To create encoded Bell
pairs over each link, we consume physical Bell pairs and
perform unidirectional classical communication (a one-way
entanglement purification protocol, or 1-EPP).
3G repeater
In this type of network, repeaters directly send quantum states
that are encoded by QEC via unidirectional classical commu-
nication (1-EPP). This network type requires unacknowledged
but heralded loss control to enable direct transmission of states.
The individual links must have very high success probability
for creating entanglement.
D. Applications of a Quantum Internet
Based on the level of required functions, Wehner et al.
classified the development of a Quantum Internet by stage and
showed the applications provided at each stage (Tab. I [79]).
Stage 1 applications are provided using trusted nodes with
Stage of Quantum Internet Examples of known applications
1. Trusted repeater QKD (no end-to-end security)
2. Prepare and measure QKD, secure identification
3. Entanglement generation Device independent protocols
4. Quantum memory Blind quantum computation, simple
leader election and agreement protocols
5. Few qubit fault tolerant Clock synchronization, Distributed
quantum computation
6. Quantum computing Leader election, fast byzantine agree-
ment
TABLE I
STAGES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE QUANTUM INTERNET [79]. AS
THE STAGE PROGRESSES, MORE ADVANCED HARDWARE IS REQUIRED TO
DELIVER RICHER FUNCTIONS.
optical fiber or satellite links. Today, many researchers are
promoting research aimed at higher stages, and this research
also focuses on all stages.
III. HARDWARE MODEL OF THE QUANTUM INTERNET
In this section, we describe our models of QNodes and
those elements. The ultimate purpose of the Quantum In-
ternet, which consists of distributed QNode connected with
both quantum channels and classical channels, is to create
entanglement between two or more terminal application qubits
in two distant QNodes chosen at the discretion of the ap-
plication user. We assume each quantum node has a unique
address. Since all quantum nodes require both quantum and
classical communication, a natural approach is to use global
IP addresses as an addressing scheme. This is also the most
general, from the point of view of security analysis.
A. Elements of a QNode
An MNode (Fig. 2a) has exactly one Quantum Network
Interface Card (QNIC) assisted by a Node Controller (C4)
and a Classical Network Interface Card (CNIC).
An ENode (Fig. 2b) has exactly one QNIC and an appli-
cation module that has terminal qubits (QApplication), also
assisted by a C4 and a CNIC.
An RNode (Fig. 2c) is built from exactly one CNIC and a
C4, with exactly two QNICs, internally homogeneous device,
internal operations all done via local gates; may incorporate
BSA (Bell states analyzer) device, or may not.
An XNode (Fig. 2d) is built from multiple QNICs and
Quantum Buffer (QBuffer), single CNIC and a C4.
We classify these components into two planes, classical and
quantum, and elaborate below.
B. Quantum plane elements of a QNode
Quantum Network Interface Card (QNIC)
A QNIC is a quantum network’s equivalent of a classical
NIC (Network Interface Card). Depending on the physical
implementation, it may consist of transmitters, receivers or
detectors, and qubits (QNIC qubits) used to create entangle-
ment with a remote QNIC’s qubits. A QNIC has both internal
and external interfaces. An internal interface consists of both
control and quantum connections to other elements in the
QNode. An external interface is a quantum channel, combined
with basic, hard real time classical signaling for framing and
sequencing. A QNIC will be connected to a counterpart QNIC
with a physical link such as fiber.
A hard real-time controller in a QNIC also handles all real-
time operation, such as automatic creation of on-physical-link
entanglement [66].
The node controller can direct the QNIC to operate on
QNIC-qubits.
QBuffer
A QBuffer is a pool of qubits (Buffer-qubits) between a QNIC
and a Switch or between QApplication and a Switch, that can
be entangled then swapped with QNIC-qubits (or counterpart
Buffer-qubits). QBuffer-qubits may have different physical
characteristics than QNIC-qubits. A QBuffer may be optional
depending on workload and hardware design, but our analysis
assumes it is present.
QApplication
A QApplication has terminal qubits, intended for quantum
applications. These qubits can be entangled or swapped
with QNIC-qubits, and hence can be entangled with remote
QApplication-qubits.
QNIC-qubits
Each QNIC has multiple qubits (QNIC-qubits). QNIC-qubits
are exposed to external channels and can create entanglements
with remote QNIC-qubits.
Buffer-qubits
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Fig. 2. Model of QNodes. (a) MNode must be able to measure QNIC-qubits in any basis. MNodes may measure incoming qubits photon detectors. (b) ENode
can perform universal computations on Terminal qubits. Like other QNodes, we can separate components into Quantum plane and Classical plane. (c) An
RNode connects two non-adjacent QNodes. (d) XNode connects to several QNodes and is responsible for communicating on various routes.
Buffer-qubits in a QBuffer can hold entangled states but not
optically connected to outside, freeing QNIC-qubits for reuse.
Terminal-qubits
Terminal-qubits in a QApplication.
Quantum node internal links
All quantum elements in a QNode are connected by quantum
internal links.
Optical switch (Switch)
An optical switch (e.g., a nanomechanical crossbar [44])
changes the optical connections between quantum plane el-
ements. Although such switches can be used in the long-
distance optical paths [27], here we focus on use inside a node
with multiple QNICs to achieve non-blocking photon routing.
A node with a single or two QNICs would not need a Switch
(Fig. 2).
C. Classical plane elements of a QNode
Classical Network Interface Card (CNIC)
A CNIC is a standard classical network interface that can be
connected to the classical Internet. We assume this to be an
interface such as Ethernet. The CNIC provides inter-repeater
and application node communications, generally carrying soft
real time information necessary for interpreting quantum in-
formation and determining future operations.
Realtime Controller
A real-time controller controls the qubits in each unit, meeting
the hard real time constraints for maintaining quantum states
and performing operations on qubits either individually or
collectively. In our current model, three types of real-time
controller are shown: the QNIC real-time controller, the Buffer
real-time controller and the Application real-time controller.
C4 (Node Controller)
The Classical Chassis Controller Card communicates with
other QNodes and controls QNIC, QBuffer and QApplication
to achieve its goal: for a repeater node, to create entanglement
between a local QNIC-qubit and a remote QNIC-qubit; for
an application node, to create entanglement between a local
terminal qubit and a remote qubit via its QNIC-qubit, to run
an application.
Classical node internal links
All classical elements in a QNode are connected by classical
internal links.
Other classical computing elements
Since a QNode consists of hybrid classical computing
elements and quantum elements, it also may have various clas-
sical computing elements such as clock, memory, processor,
and chassis including expansion buses or backplanes.
D. Elements of QNode to QNode connection and external
resource
A QNode requires several external resources to operate.
Classical external connectivity
Through a CNIC, QNodes are connected to the Internet. All
QNodes may communicate with each other via this external
classical connectivity.
Quantum external connectivity
All QNICs are connected to other adjacent QNICs (or QN-
odes) via optical links so that each pair of directly connected
QNodes needs to share Bell pairs as the first step of quantum
communication. Such a link is point-to-point system for creat-
ing entanglement. A Bell pair are shared between non-adjacent
QNodes by entanglement swapping operation at the relay
QNodes, in first and second generation quantum networks. In
third generation, an encoder forwarded to non-adjacent nodes.
We modeled three types of QNode-to-QNode connections,
based on their schemes for generating Bell pairs [42]:
1) Memory to Memory link (M → M ): An M → M
consists of two QNodes. One QNode receives a photon from
a connected RNode (or ENode) and creates Bell pairs using a
BSA (Bell states analyzer) entangler.
2) Memories and BSA node link (M → I ←M ): AnM →
I ←M consists of two QNodes and one standalone BSA node
at the midpoint of the link. The BSA node receives a photon
entangled with the QNIC-qubit in the connected QNode from
each QNode, and create Bell pairs between the QNIC-qubits
by measuring the photons together, using the BSA entangler.
3) EPPS node and Memories link (M ← S → M ): An
M ← S → M consists of two QNodes and one standalone
entangled photon pair source (EPPS) at the midpoint of the
link. An EPPS creates photonic Bell pairs and transmits them
to connected RNodes (or ENodes).
6Standalone devices may have external classical links too.
IV. PRIMITIVE ATTACKS ON QUANTUM NODES
In this section, we describe the primitive attacks on the
quantum Internet, by element. Quantum network devices hold
the quantum plane and the classical plane. The quantum
plane holds qubits and quantum channels. The classical plane
holds quantum application software, qubit controllers, classical
channels, and operating systems. Both shares links. Primitive
attacks come externally. (More complex attacks may be caused
internally by the hijacked components; including physical
security violation.)
This section summarizes how primitive attacks affect the
security CIA (Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability). The CIA
of Nodes and links introduced in Sec. III can be considered
by combining elemental discussion of primitive components
in this Section. Since quantum information has no-cloning
theorem, confidentiality, integrity and availability have close
linkage. For example, by stealing quantum data from a quan-
tum variable, another value can be set in the quantum variable.
In this case, an attack on confidentiality attacks integrity, too.
The focus of this paper is categorizing attacks, hence such
relationships are beyond the scope.
Functionality of quantum networks is to manipulate quan-
tum data. In this sense, attacks on the quantum plane are
fundamentally attacks on data. Attacks on classical plane are
attacks on programs, as well.
A. QNIC-qubits
QNIC-qubits in QNICs are used only temporarily. Once the
entanglement which the QNIC-qubits hold is transferred to
buffer-qubits or terminal-qubits, QNIC-qubits play no further
role in that operation. QNIC-qubits are connected with other
qubits either by the inter-node quantum channel or the in-node
quantum channel (see below). Since optical fibers for inter-
node quantum channel are attached to QNIC-qubits directly,
interface qubits are most exposed to external risks.
1) Quantum Plane: Since interface qubits have direct con-
tact with the world outside of the QNode via a physical
quantum channel, they may be the most vulnerable elements.
• Confidentiality
Malicious entanglement may QNIC-qubits have via the
external quantum channel, by receiving maliciously en-
tangled qubits or by having half Bell pairs sent from this
interface entangled with malicious qubits by eavesdrop-
pers’ operations. Malicious entanglement would result the
theft of valuable quantum data if quantum teleportation is
following and executed without awareness of the attack.
The essential countermeasure for this vulnerability is
quantum state tomography. Assuming interface qubits
are used to temporarily hold half Bell pairs (completely
generic states with no secret information) before teleport-
ing valuable quantum data, quantum state tomography
randomly selects some of the Bell pairs to measure to
determine if an eavesdropper has not entangled her qubits
with ours, as we described in Sec. II. Target qubits
must be isolated from external networks in this kind of
verification scheme, because cracking of Bell tests via
photon detector has been demonstrated [41]. If some
half Bell pairs are entangled to qubits of eavesdroppers
somehow such that only a few qubits are stolen so as
to not be get detected by quantum state tomography, the
confidentiality of valuable quantum data depends on that
of the classical channel. This is because the quantum
teleportation to transfer the valuable quantum data, which
follows sharing Bell pairs, uses the classical channel.
If the classical channel retains confidentiality, interface
qubits also retains confidentiality. This is because the
eavesdropper merely gets a completely mixed state in
the absence of the observed value sent via the classical
channel.
Optical probes have been demonstrated. Among the
many attacks on QKD implementations developed in
Makarov’s lab, Jain et al. described an eavesdropper
that can probe a BB84 quantum key distribution (QKD)
system [8] by sending a bright pulse from the quan-
tum channel into the interface and analyzing the back-
reflected pulses [36], a classical attack on the hardware
used for the quantum states. Though entanglement-based
QKD protocols do not have this weakness, a similar
attack in which some optical detectors are saturated could
be used in a man-in-the-middle attack.
• Integrity
Malicious entanglement affects QNIC-qubits, therefore
disrupts the integrity.
Fault injections on interface qubits may involve insert-
ing unauthorized and unexpected optical pulses into the
quantum channel [11], [48].
Out-of-system attacks such as direct irradiation of a
device with RF noise could damage the quantum data and
leave garbage. Such attacks may work as any quantum
operation, including non-computational operation, such
as leakage from computational basis. For that kind of
attack, an attacker may not even need access to the
target device itself, as radio waves can blanket an area
from a modest distance. Even with good RF shielding,
interference effects as weak as subway power and control
systems a kilometer away are known to affect some
systems.
• Availability
Malicious entanglement to steal quantum data may
result in disruption of the availability due to no-cloning
theorem [83].
Fault injections may disturb the state of interface qubits,
affecting availability.
Blinding of detectors by inserting optical pulses results
in failure of detecting photons.
Out-of-system attacks such as RF noise affect availabil-
ity too, by preventing the designed operation of qubits.
Other attacks, such as on the cooling or other control
systems, may be harder to carry out remotely.
Destruction or removal of hardware and other typical
classic attacks prevent the designed operation of the
qubits, if the attacker has access to the target device.
72) Classical Plane (interface qubit controller): Since in-
terface qubits are controlled by a classical controller, a com-
promise on the controller side (software or hardware) allow
crackers to control interface qubits arbitrarily, depending on
implemented operations.
• Confidentiality
Hijacked controller may disclose the quantum data via
any session, disrupting the confidentiality.
• Integrity
Hijacked controller may manipulate qubits to alter
values coherently in chosen ways such as flipping bits,
to measure values, or to initialize values, disrupting the
integrity.
• Availability
Hijacked controller may disrupt availability for arbitrary
sessions.
B. Buffer-qubits
Buffer-qubits are used for temporal buffering for in-node
qubit transmissions. Buffer-qubits can interact with either
interface qubits or terminal qubits. Since buffer-qubits them-
selves do not have any external connectivity, they are not
exposed to risks from external (inter-node) quantum channels
or that from the application side of other hardware directly.
1) Quantum Plane: Data in a classical memory buffer can
be assumed to be “safe”, untouchable from the outside world
provided the buffer cannot be reached by DMA hardware
that can be activated from outside and the host OS has not
been compromised. Our quantum data are similarly safe from
fault injection once stored in terminal qubits. Even if an
eavesdropper has entangled a qubit of hers with our quantum
variable before it reaches this buffer, she gains no access to
information she did not already have at the time she entangled
her qubit with ours. Randomized quantum tomography while
working with a stream of Bell pairs is needed here as well as
on interface qubits.
• Confidentiality
Malicious entanglement may be inserted via QNIC-
qubits, terminal-qubits, or other buffer-qubits.
• Integrity
Malicious entanglement and Out-of-system attacks are
threats against confidentiality of buffer-qubits as well as
QNIC-qubits.
• Availability
Malicious entanglement, Out-of-system attacks, and
classical attacks such as Destruction or removal of
hardware are threats against availability of buffer-qubits
as well as QNIC-qubits.
2) Classical Plane (interface qubit controller): As well as
QNIC-qubits, compromises on classical controllers are serious
threats.
• Confidentiality
Hijacked controller may disclose the quantum data via
any session, disrupting the confidentiality.
• Integrity
Hijacked controller may manipulate qubits to alter
values coherently in chosen ways such as flipping bits,
to measure values, or to initialize values, disrupting the
integrity.
• Availability
Hijacked controller may disrupt availability for arbitrary
sessions.
C. Terminal-qubits
The ultimate goal of the Quantum Internet system is to
create entanglement among qubits in QApplication. The quan-
tum application executes quantum operations only on terminal-
qubits. Quantum end node must have terminal-qubits; quantum
repeater and quantum router optionally may have them. Since
terminal-qubits themselves do not have any external connec-
tivity, they are not exposed to risks from external (inter-node)
quantum channels directly. However, since it is assumed that
the quantum application can execute any quantum operation on
the terminal-qubits, a compromise of the application software
is a compromise of the terminal-qubits.
1) Quantum Plane: Discussions for buffer-qubits can be
applied to terminal-qubits, but for compromise of the applica-
tion software.
• Confidentiality
Malicious entanglement may be inserted via QNIC-
qubits, or other buffer-qubits.
• Integrity
Malicious entanglement and Out-of-system attacks are
threats against confidentiality of terminal qubits, as well
as QNIC-qubits and buffer-qubits.
• Availability
Malicious entanglement, Out-of-sytem attacks, and
classical attacks such as Destruction or removal of
hardware are threats against availability of terminal-
qubits, as well as QNIC-qubits and buffer-qubits.
2) Classical Plane: Terminal-qubits are controlled by a
quantum application controller. Therefore, a compromise on
the application side of the hardware affects terminal-qubits.
Since the application controller is not a networking function-
ality, the detail of this loss of control is beyond scope of this
paper. However, such threats from applications need careful
discussion.
• Confidentiality
Hijacked controller may disclose the quantum data via
any session, disrupting the confidentiality.
Malicious application may disclose the quantum data via
any session, disrupting the confidentiality. Since funda-
mentally other components are not made to detect abnor-
malities of quantum applications, malicious applications
are hard to detect.
• Integrity
Hijacked controller and Malicious application may
manipulate qubits to alter values coherently in chosen
ways such as flipping bits, to measure values, or to
initialize values, disrupting the integrity.
• Availability
Hijacked controller and Malicious application may
disrupt availability for arbitrary sessions.
8D. In-node quantum channels
In-node quantum channels provide interconnection between
terminal-qubits, buffer-qubits and interface qubits. Since in-
node quantum channels are not exposed to the outside of the
node, attacks require indirect access or physical access to the
hardware.
• Confidentiality
Optical probes are not executable on the in-node quan-
tum channel without directly modifying the hardware.
• Integrity
Out-of-system attacks would alter the state of qubits.
Fault injections are not executable on the in-node quan-
tum channel without directly modifying the hardware.
• Availability
Destruction or removal of hardware and Out-of-
system attacks may compromise availability.
E. In-node classical channels
Here we stick to in-node classical channels as a subsystem
of in-node qubit transmission functionality, such as transfer-
ring meta-information, Pauli frames1 or acknowledgments on
of quantum channels. Since in-node classical channels are not
exposed to the outside of the node, attacks require indirect
access or physical access to the hardware.
• Confidentiality
Hijacked controller may leak at most meta-information,
such as session information and the usage.
• Integrity
Hijacked controller may change management informa-
tion such as Pauli frames, resulting in altering quantum
states.
• Availability
Hijacked controller can behave as if the channel is out of
order. It also can sabotage particular sessions, by abusing
probabilistic nature of quantum channels.
F. Inter-node quantum channels
By using an inter-node quantum channel, node-to-node
single hop entanglement is created between interface qubits.
Since inter-node quantum channels are exposed, they are
potential targets of attacks.
• Confidentiality
Eavesdropping on photons flying in fibers affects confi-
dentiality if valuable quantum data is encoded onto pho-
tons. Transferring half Bell pairs and executing quantum
teleportation afterwards would protect valuable quantum
data from eavesdropping as long as the operation is
authenticated properly.
A kind of Optical probe may be used to determine
hardware settings, while the detector saturation attack
described above could be used to control what the
classical hardware sees. More analysis of this impact
on repeater operation is necessary. Since an inter-node
quantum channel is physically just a optical fiber or
1The Pauli frame of a qubit defines its polarity relative to a reference signal.
similar media between QNodes, it is relatively easy to
get access to these channels.
• Integrity
Fault injections exist and affect integrity by accessing
fibers. The attack could be like a man-in-the-middle by
cutting fibers and inserting hardware, or tapping the fiber.
It is known that altering the temperature of fibers changes
quantum states going through.
Photon injection would be performed by an attacker
via fiber, reaching detectors. Depending on the design of
the repeaters, attacker also can inject photon that reaches
QNIC-qubit in repeaters.
• Availability
Eavesdropping works as an attack on availability, be-
cause it breaks the quantum states. This denial of service
attack is one of the most obvious weaknesses of quantum
networks if robustness is an important design goal. Since
an inter-node quantum channel is just a fiber or such
cable between QNodes, it is relatively easy to get access
to these channels.
G. Inter-node classical channels
Inter-node classical channels are used to coordinate with
other nodes, and used as a subsystem of in-node qubit trans-
mission functionality. Since inter-node classical channels are
exposed, they are potential targets of attacks. All classical
attacks aimed at inter-node classical channels may be possible.
Attacks specific to a quantum network system’s classical
channel might be possible in each of following categories.
• Confidentiality
Vulnerable to classical attacks including but not limited
to: eavesdropping, and other privacy threats such as
tracking.
• Integrity
Hijacked controller may change management informa-
tion, resulting in altering quantum states.
Man-in-the-middle attack can disrupt the generation
of Bell pairs, in many ways, overwriting Pauli frames,
disnegotiation, and so on. If Pauli frames are overwritten,
it is difficult to determine whether the disturbance of
the quantum state is caused by the attack on classical
communication or quantum communication.
• Availability
Denial of Service attacks disrupt the coordination mes-
sages, and obstruct such as ack messages for photons,
hence affecting availability.
H. Optical switch (crossbar)
Optical switches are settled in QNodes for switching quan-
tum connections. Optical switches obey a routing table. There-
fore a hijacked routing table data can makes the optical switch
dysfunctional.
1) Quantum Plane:
• Confidentiality
Attacks on the quantum plane of optical switches do
not affect confidentiality, because an optical switch is
9just a “pipe” of photons with switching paths classically
obeying the controller.
• Integrity
Out-of-system attacks would alter the state of photons
during transfer, as well as in-node quantum channels.
• Availability
Destruction or removal of hardware and Out-of-
system attacks may compromise availability.
2) Classical Plane:
• Confidentiality
Switching disruption, disobeying routing information,
would forward quantum variables to eavesdroppers. This
attack is achieved by hijacked controller of optical
switches or by falsified routing information.
• Integrity
Switching disruption would work as malicious entan-
glement and may result in inserting incorrect quantum
variables.
• Availability
Switching disorder affects availability.
I. Detectors with BSAs
Detectors with BSAs are used to “connect” entanglement
by entanglement swapping. Those detectors are connected to
buffer-qubits, terminal-qubits or interface-qubits via an optical
switch or directly. Detection is actually a conversion from
quantum information to classical information. For XNodes,
those (backplane) detectors are located behind the optical
switch and are not exposed. For intermediate nodes, these
detectors are optically connected to the inter-node channel
directly and are exposed.
1) Quantum Plane:
• Confidentiality
For XNodes, an detector is the dead end for photons and
is not exposed. Hence the quantum plane does not affect
confidentiality.
If exposed, Optical probes may be used to determine
hardware settings, or may be used to control what the
classical hardware sees. Therefore confidentiality is af-
fected.
• Integrity
Out-of-system attacks would alter the quantum states.
If exposed, fault injections to fake signals would be
executable.
• Availability
Out-of-system attacks would inject noise and correct
signals become unrecognizable due to such noise.
Destruction or removal of hardware may compromise
availability.
If exposed, fault injections may compromise availability.
2) Classical Plane:
• Confidentiality
Attacks on the classical plane of detectors with BSAs
may not affect confidentiality.
• Integrity
Falsified measurement outcome by hijacked controller
or by out-of-system attacks alters residual quantum
states, affecting integrity.
• Availability
Hijacked controller may sabotage sessions selectively.
J. EPPS
An Entangled Photon Pair Source may be connected to
inter-node quantum channels in intermediate nodes, or may
be used along an in-node quantum channel in other nodes.
EPPS is a simple component which continuously creates and
sends entangled photons to connected two components. Hence,
a complex attack is not achievable.
1) Quantum Plane:
• Confidentiality
EPPS does not affect confidentiality.
• Integrity
EPPS does not affect integrity.
• Availability
By altering the power of input light would affect avail-
ability.
2) Classical Plane:
• Confidentiality
EPPS does not affect confidentiality.
• Integrity
Hijacking EPPS leads to generate a false bell pair.
• Availability
Attacks to clock synchronization results in breaking
availability.
K. Other components
As component, optical switch (crossbar), detectors with
BSAs, and EPPS would exist in quantum network devices.
Those modules are actually discussed above as in-node quan-
tum/classical channels.
Attacks on classical computing elements are well studied
and explained by e.g. Weingart [80]. In our networks, the
following classical computing elements have the potential to
be attacked:
• CNIC
• Controller resources (such as clock, memory, processor)
• Chassis providing electric power.
V. ATTACKS USING HIJACKED QNODE(S)
In this section, we investigate what attacker(s) can do if they
successfully hijack full control of QNode(s).
The Quantum Internet will continuously use a certain
amount of performance for cross-validation to detect anoma-
lies such as equipment failures or hijacking [69].
• Each QNode regularly and continuously verifies neigh-
boring nodes and their assigned communications.
• The network performs these verifications at irregular
intervals during normal communication and eventually
detects the presence of an attacker.
Under these circumstances, what can an attacker do with
the hijacked node before her presence is detected? First, we
discuss the case where the attacker successfully hijacked one
QNode.
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A. Attacks by a malicious end user
What can a malicous terminal node, a MNode or an ENode,
do to attack the network?
1) False failure report: An attack by a MNnode would be
nothing more than a false report claiming a network failure
for reduction of availability. If an attacker complains that an
application such as BQC will not work, the network will need
some work for careful self-verification. The network system
can then conclude with a false claim or MNode failure.
2) QDOS (Quantum Denial of Service attack): A DOS (De-
nial of Service attack) attack is a typical availability attack
on the classical Internet. Attacks on network resources, such
as network bandwidth and server computing power, will also
work against the Quantum Internet. Since the quantum state
cannot be replicated [83], the damage will be more serious
than the classical DOS. In particular, we should be wary of
direct Qubit transmissions on 3G repeaters, if the data qubits
themselves are sent via the Quantum Internet (If half-Bell pair
is sent followed by quantum teleportation, it does not matter).
As examples of QDOS, we assume the following attacks:
• A malicious user requests an oversized quantum key
distribution for the quantum link bandwidth.
• A malicious user requests a massive number of calcula-
tions to a cloud quantum computer.
ENode and MNode are capable of these attacks.
As part of QDOS, an ENode can also perform some
form of "eavesdropping" using fraudulently entangled qubits.
Eavesdropping is very simple to implement given physical
access to an ENode anywhere in the chain.
3) Dishonest quantum computation: An ENode can carry
out more sophisticated attacks to reduce integrity. When we
perform distributed quantum computation, it is risky to commit
part of the calculation to an external ENode. An attacker
could send incorrect quantum information via teleportation
or perform wrong calculations. It is challenging to ensure
the redundancy of quantum information by the no-cloning
theorem. We need to perform calculations using trusted nodes,
or adopt a method that allows reliable quantum calculations
even with a small number of fraudsters.
B. Attacks by a malicious repeater node
An RNode can perform all three types of attacks that
ENode (MNode) can do because an Rnode has a higher-level
function than ENode (see Fig. 2c).
1) Composite attack: The details of the attack by an RNode
may differ depending on the role of the target node. For
example, an RNode can perform the following attacks:
• Hijacked RNode does the Bell test to check the link
status in good faith, and the work for the inter-node
communication responds in bad faith. This attack will
cause the network to suspect another node has failed.
• The attacker disables the inter-XNode link to which the
RNode belongs due to an intentional RNode malfunction.
Other communications must use other circuitous links,
and attackers can achieve network inefficiencies.
We can classify these attacks into QDOS with dishonest
quantum computation. To prevent more severe performance
degradation, the network needs to perform a Bell test unde-
tected by the attacker [69].
2) Man in the middle attack: This attack technique, which
is popular in the classical Internet, can also be used in the
Quantum Internet by using a hijacked RNode. For example,
we assume a 1G network for QKD operation using BBM92
(Fig. 3) [9]. A and B share a Bell pair for quantum com-
Ａ Ｅ Ｂ
1. E sabotages entanglement swapping between A and B.
2. E shares a secret key with A (B) by impersonating B (A).
3. E uses two keys to eavesdrop on the private key 
communication between A and B.
Fig. 3. Man in the middle attack on the Quantum Internet.
munication, so they ask E for entanglement swapping. The
hijacked RNode E sabotages the instructions and continues to
share the Bell pair with A and B. A and B try to generate a
secret key via teleportation, but actually share the key with E,
who is impersonating the other. E uses these keys to decrypt
and re-encrypt the encrypted information transferred between
A and B.
C. Attacks by a malicious router node
An XNode is the most powerful QNode and can perform all
the attacks that an RNode can do. When an attacker aims to
maximize the hijacking time and the range of influence while
remaining undetected, the following attack means are available
in addition to the above attacks [69].
1) Switching disruption: An attacker can execute entangle-
ment swapping without following the distributed ruleset [52],
and forward the Qubit to a node far away from the destina-
tion (Fig. 4). We can detect the intentionally wrong entangle-
ment swapping operation by Bell test, but we cannot avoid
the negative effects on availability and integrity before the
detection [69].
B’
Ｂ
Ａ Ｅ A’
Ｃ
Ｂ
Ａ Ｅ
3G1G,2G
Invalid  ES
Invalid  ES
False reports
False reports
Correct path
Invalid transfer
Fig. 4. With the 1G or 2G hijacked Xnode E, attacker can share Bell pairs
between incorrect pairs A−B′ and A′−B instead of correct pairs A−A′ and
B − B′ using malicious entanglement swapping. In the case of 3G repeater
network, intentionally qubits transfer to a inappropriate QNodes C instead of
destination B. These disruptions decrease network availability and integrity
of transferred information.
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2) Framing innocent repeaters: The hijacker can frame
another innocent QNode using the combination of false failure
report and dishonest quantum computation. For every suc-
cessful framing by hijacked Xnode, the processing power of
the network is reduced. A lot of framing would eventually
partition the network (Fig. 5), a very serious disruption. Even
a single highjacked node can partition the network. To prevent
such threats, we need to detect and respond as soon as possible.
Ｘ
Ｘ
Ｘ
Ｘ
Ｘ
Ｘ
Ｘ
Ｘ Severed network
Hijacked
Framed
Fig. 5. A network partitioned by the isolation of innocent QNodes. Red nodes
denote isolated innocent nodes. The blue node denotes hijacked XNode. Solid
lines denote working links. Dashed lines denote links cut by surrounding
innocent nodes due to framing. The repeated success of framing leads to this
situation. Due to differences in the frequency of communications, the closer
a QNode is to a hijacked XNode, the more vulnerable it is.
The loss of availability due to the isolation of the router
from the network is more significant than other nodes due
to a large amount of communication involved. To avoid a
significant network performance loss due to the isolation of
a router, we should design the network with as many links
connected to each router as possible. Besides, we must operate
routers connected to a large number of links in an environment
that is as reliable as possible.
3) Path Black Hole: The early quantum Internet will have
path-setup at first in the classical (management) plane and then
quantum plane starts to generate End-to-End entanglements.
Therefore, the packet black hole attack by advertising in-
correct address block results in collecting path-setup classical
packets. The classical packets will not arrive at the destination.
Therefore the quantum path will not be set up, hence such
black hole attacks won’t waste quantum plane resources. This
is different from the sabotage attack by a single node which
results in wasting quantum plane resources.
D. Attacks by multiple hijacked QNodes
Next, we discuss the case where the attacker successfully
hijacked multiple QNodes. The attack methods available to
each node remain the same, but combining them will change
the situation. We investigate what kinds of attacks are possible
or enhanced, depending on the combination of malicious
nodes.
1) QDDoS: First, we consider the possible attack meth-
ods for the cooperated malicious ENodes and MNodes. A
distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack is a method that
compromises availability by attacking a single Internet service
from many machines at once. As in the classic DDoS, the
DDoS in the Quantum Internet (QDDoS) attacks available to
end-users will be cost-effective and malicious. We can divide
QDDoS into attacks on the classical plane as system controller
and assaults on the quantum plane as quantum resources
provider.
As with server crashes caused by DDoS, failure of the
system controller can cause not only service outages but
also loss of information on the terminal Qubit and QNIC
Qubit. The reconstruction of quantum information is more
complicated than classical information. The classic system
responsible for managing these Qubits should be independent
of the systems affected by QDDoS.
As a way to attack the quantum plane, we can expect
an excessive number of service requests. If the applications
we provide are quantum key generation or cloud quantum
computation, increasing the number of QNODEs can address
the attack. If an application requires manipulation of certain
quantum information, the attack can cause significant service
delays and information loss.
2) Framing using multiple hijacked QNodes: In order for a
hijacker to perform framing, the target QNode needs to be
on the communication path. Assuming no bias in network
structure or frequency of use, hijacker is less likely to frame
QNodes that are farther away from the hijacked QNode. If
you succeed in multiple hijackings, the situation will change.
It is difficult to quantitatively discuss threats without defining
the network structure, but a (false) call from multiple nodes
could more easily fool the network.
VI. CONCLUSION
This work is the first attempt to summarize the threats on
the Quantum Internet. Modeling threats is an essential work to
provide countermeasures against attacks, therefore, essential to
achieve secure and sustainable quantum networks. The current
Internet is showing that situations of security issues are always
changing. Threat models needs to be kept updated.
We have provided an analysis of security for a quantum
repeater architecture based on our current knowledge, by refer-
ring to proposed taxonomies for classical systems, especially
RFID systems. By providing a model of a quantum repeater
network and grouping the elements of the modeled repeater,
we provide a first look at the kinds of attacks that may be
possible.
From the point of view of confidentiality, quantum repeater
systems have great advantages. Since it is possible to detect
the presence of an eavesdropper, detection of a breach of
confidentiality is possible. Quantum tomography sacrifices a
portion of our stream of Bell pairs as part of ongoing network
monitoring operations as needed to tune certain physical pa-
rameters to optimize the fidelity of our entanglement. This pro-
cess is extended to include eavesdropper detection by choosing
the portion sacrificed for tomography at random. As long as
tomography indicates that high fidelity is achieved on the end-
to-end connection, our remaining stream of entangled qubits
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can be safely used without fear of breach of confidentiality if
the other end point and application are secure.
From the point of view of integrity and availability, a
quantum repeater system seems to be not so different from
a classical network system.
A repeater includes classical computing hardware and
threats to both integrity and availability can target that hard-
ware. Of course, part of the hardware is specially designed
for a quantum system, but quantum system hardware is just
a special kind of hardware. As we have shown in previous
section, the possible attacks are very similar to classical
systems.
One of the keys to security of the quantum repeater system
is not a quantum system specific issue, but rather the classical
parts of the system, including the classical part of the quantum
node and classical network services in the node, which are
no different from classical network equipment. Mixed attacks
making use of a combination of quantum and classical parts
may also prove to be an important topic.
One big difference is that quantum mechanics has the no-
cloning theorem; quantum information cannot be copied in
case loss in the network like classical networking. In this
sense, direct transmitting data qubits in the 3rd generation has
more serious risk against DoS attacks. This problem can be
avoided by sending half Bell pairs even in the 3rd generation.
In that case, distributed connection management is required.
There will be choices of protocols, rapid and memory-efficient
but risky protocol which sends data qubits directly, and safe
but slow and memory-inefficient protocol which sends half
Bell pairs then executes quantum teleportation.
This paper, comprising a framework of attack points and
goals, represents only the first step in assessing the security
of quantum networks. We plan to extend our study further as
engineers working in both classical and quantum networking,
to apply the lessons learned in classical networks to develop
a full taxonomy of attacks, assess mitigation strategies, and
ultimately minimize security issues with developing quantum
networks.
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